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Over the past half-century, the world has enjoyed unparalleled
economic growth and prosperity. It is generally recognized that this
has come about because the world has been more or less at peace
during this period, because in more and more countries democracy
has taken root, and because the system for governing world trade
that was put into place after the Second World War succeeded be-
yond anyone's wildest dreams. Today, after the successful conclu-
sion of the eighth round of negotiations under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, which has served (somewhat
awkwardly) as the world's trading charter, and the launching of the
new World Trade Organization, we are looking for ways to assure
the same kind of growth and prosperity for the next century. In one
form or another, competition policy will surely play an important
role in this process. By the same token, antitrust or competition pol-
icy is not the only tool that will be needed as we work to keep mar-
kets open, free, and competitive in the 21st century.
In the time available this morning, I would like to take a closer
look at the roles antitrust might play in the post-Uruguay Round
world. After a brief look backward, at earlier efforts to incorporate
antitrust principles into the rules for world trade, I look in some
detail at the various options that are available to us that would, to
lesser or greater degrees, "internationalize" antitrust law. Finally, I
will discuss the ways in which the Department of Justice is working
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to improve effective enforcement of antitrust rules in international
markets.
I. EVOLUTION OF RULES FOR THE GLOBAL MARKET
A brief look at the history of the development of rules for the
global marketplace reveals a process something like peeling an on-
ion. Immediately after the conclusion of World War II, efforts be-
gan to construct an open, liberal world trading system, which would
have had three pillars: an International Monetary Fund, to govern
world financial policy; an International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (or the World Bank), for economic development in
both the war-devastated countries and the Third World; and an In-
ternational Trade Organization, to govern all aspects of world trade,
including not only classical governmental trade restrictions such as
tariffs, but also subjects such as investment policy and competition
policy.
The first two pillars of the system were, of course, established, but
the third was stillborn. Instead, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, which had already been negotiated, was put into effect
as a stand-alone agreement. The original GATT dealt principally
with direct barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, although
even it had modest provisions that addressed nontariff barriers, such
as discriminatory customs valuation procedures, government pro-
curement practices, and subsidies. The GATT also had a dispute
resolution procedure, under which countries could complain either
about actual GATT violations on the part of other Contracting Par-
ties, or any other measures that would "nullify or impair" benefits
that had been given to the complaining party in GATT negotiations.
The initial tariff reductions that were achieved in the 1947 GATT
negotiations sent an important signal to a world that still recalled
the disaster of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and the world-
wide recession that followed it. Encouraged by their success, the
Contracting Parties undertook successive additional rounds of tariff
negotiations designed to achieve ever-greater cuts. This process con-
tinued until the so-called Kennedy Round of negotiations, which
lasted from 1962 through 1967. What distinguished the Kennedy
Round was not the absence of tariff negotiations. Efforts to reduce
tariffs had become, if anything, even more serious. Instead, it was
the realization that barriers to world trade apart from tariffs needed
serious attention. So, for example, the Kennedy Round resulted in a
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more elaborate Anti-Dumping Code than had ever been adopted,
which attempted to clarify the rules with respect to this type of un-
fair trade practice. (The Congress of the United States never ap-
proved this Code.)
Attention to non-tariff barriers to trade accelerated during the
Tokyo Round of negotiations, which concluded in 1979, and these
issues took center stage in the Uruguay Round. Going further, the
Uruguay Round negotiators took on the extraordinarily difficult is-
sues of agricultural trade, trade-related investment measures, and
trade-related intellectual property rules. It is to their great credit
that the Round concluded with agreements on all these topics, and
to the great credit of the President and the Congress that the Uru-
guay Round implementing legislation was passed and signed into
law last December 8th.
Each step along this road - from high tariffs to lower tariffs,
from tariffs in any form to other direct trade restrictions (such as
quotas), from direct restrictions to the innumerable non-tariff barri-
ers, and finally to government policies that affect the international
trading system (such as intellectual property rules and investment
regimes) - has had one thing in common. Each one has dealt with
governmental rules and regulations, that are subject to negotiation
by governments, and that can be monitored. As these have been ad-
dressed, however, it has become apparent that private restrictions
can also have an important effect on the openness of the interna-
tional trading system. And one natural place to look for rules relat-
ing to private restraints of trade is the antitrust laws, which are
designed to assure that markets operate competitively.
As Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman has made clear,
antitrust law right now is being enforced in the United States with
full awareness of the relevance of international competition. We de-
fine global, regional, hemispheric, or North American markets when
the evidence shows that they exist. Our jurisdiction extends, accord-
ing to the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, to re-
straints overseas that have a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on U.S. import or domestic commerce, or on the
export commerce of U.S. exporters. The question for today is what,
if anything, do antitrust rules have to contribute to the problem of
private restraints affecting international trade?
The short answer is that antitrust laws, used properly and effec-
tively, have a lot to contribute. As the economic world shrinks, it
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will be vitally important to ensure the effective enforcement of com-
petition laws that are designed to maximize consumer welfare and
economic efficiency. The effect on the global trading environment,
over the medium to long term, will be to create a strong basis for
efficient transactions and arrangements, open competitive opportu-
nity, and global prosperity. About this, I believe there is little dis-
pute. The debate has rather been over the best means to that end. I
will describe five different approaches that have been advanced in
various fora, and in the course of doing so, I will indicate which
ones appear to be the most promising at this time from my own
perspective.
II. OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT STEPS
The first option for achieving this kind of improved global com-
petitive regime is simple: continued strong enforcement of the U.S.
antitrust laws, whenever the necessary effects on U.S. commerce are
present. As the draft Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Interna-
tional Operations issued last October 13th state, both the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are committed
to appropriate enforcement when we have jurisdiction to do so, but
also to take full account of considerations of international comity
and the possibilities of cooperating with our counterpart agencies in
other countries when that is an option. The U.S. antitrust laws are
there to protect U.S. consumers, U.S. businesses, and U.S. markets,
and we take our enforcement responsibilities very seriously.
However, as my reference to our counterparts in other countries
suggests, we cannot and should not be the only ones with this kind
of commitment to strong enforcement. We welcome the same atti-
tude on the part of our sister enforcement agencies around the
world, and the opportunities for cooperation that this creates. Mar-
kets are interrelated - we would be like King Canute ordering the
tides to stop if we thought that the business environment could be
ordered to operate strictly within particular national boundaries.
Countries that urge the "strict territoriality" approach toward anti-
trust enforcement are simply not in touch with this reality of today's
markets. Worse yet, such a view can be positively harmful when
those countries are used as "antitrust havens" by conspirators who
seek to cartelize the U.S. market or other foreign markets, by
scheduling key meetings or incorporating entities outside the juris-
diction of countries that are committed to strong and effective anti-
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trust enforcement. If cooperation with the legitimate investigations
of the countries where the effects of such conspiracies are felt is not
forthcoming, the general cause of strong antitrust enforcement is
harmed.
A second option, which complements the first, focuses on bilateral
cooperation efforts. The United States and Canada have recently
enjoyed successes in several cases that were made possible by the
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, including the plastic dinnerware
actions and the joint investigation in the thermal fax paper industry.
These successes demonstrate that cooperation works, for the most
serious kinds of antitrust violations - those that are prosecuted
criminally in both Canada and the United States.
The United States also has a number of cooperation agreements
that do not supersede existing laws on either side, and thus do not
permit the sharing of confidential information, including those with
Germany, Australia, and (again) Canada. These agreements are
helpful both for more general exchanges of views on approaches to
antitrust enforcement matters, and for preventing conflicts from
arising when both parties have an interest in a particular case.
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
have sponsored very successful bilateral antitrust technical assis-
tance programs in Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
These contacts, and similar ones with other OECD Member Coun-
tries, have helped to create a deeper understanding of antitrust law
and policy in those countries, which in turn will contribute to their
effective integration into the world's economy.
Finally, on July 19 the International Antitrust Enforcement As-
sistance Act, with the sponsorship of the Administration, was intro-
duced in both Houses of Congress, with the co-sponsorship in the
Senate of then-Chairman Howard Metzenbaum and then-Ranking
Member Senator Strom Thurmond of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's Antitrust Subcommittee, along with Senators Hatch, Spec-
ter, Kennedy, Biden, Leahy, Simon, Simpson, and Grassley, and on
the House side with the co-sponsorship of then-Chairman Jack
Brooks and then-Ranking Minority Member Representative Hamil-
ton Fish of the House Judiciary Committee's Antitrust Subcommit-
tee.' In just ten weeks, with overwhelming bi-partisan support and
the strong support of leaders of the bar (including former Assistant
1. HR 4781 and S 2297, the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994
(103d Cong., 2d Sess.).
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Attorney General Jim Rill), the bill passed both Houses of Con-
gress. President Clinton signed it into law on November 2, 1994.
Under the new legislation, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission are authorized to enter into antitrust
mutual assistance agreements with foreign antitrust agencies. Under
these agreements, the U.S. agencies will be able to receive confiden-
tial information from the files of the foreign agencies, as well as
assistance in gathering information located in the foreign country,
and the U.S. agencies will be able to reciprocate with the same kind
of assistance in appropriate cases. This legislation is an important
step toward the internationalization of antitrust enforcement, which
we believe will contribute substantially to efforts to ensure a global
market in which competition is free to operate.
Third on the list of options are multilateral efforts that are re-
gional in scope. The pioneers of this approach, of course, are the
Europeans, who went far beyond regional efforts to harmonize com-
petition law when they created the fully integrated market of the
European Union. It is unlikely in the extreme that the United States
will become party to a regional organization whose laws would take
precedence over U.S. law, and which has its own fully independent
set of courts, as is true in the EU. More realistically, the United
States has already begun to work with its North American partners
in the Competition Working Group established by the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to bring about closer cooper-
ation among the three antitrust agencies in North America. Mexico,
as the newest Member Country of the OECD, has an impressive
new competition law, which took effect in June 1993. The Federal
Competition Agency in Mexico is up and running, under the out-
standing leadership first of Dr. Santiago Levy, and more recently of
Dr. Fernando Sanchez Ugarte. The strong competition rules in
place in all three NAFTA countries, coupled with the cooperation
and coordination that the Working Group will foster, will surely
complement the free trade rules spelled out in the NAFTA agree-
ment itself. This may be a promising model for the way in which
competition rules can and should take their part in the trading
system.
The fourth option can be termed "targeted multilateralism,"
meaning a multilateral approach toward groups of countries with
common interests of any kind. Regional efforts are a subset of this
category, but an important enough one to be treated separately.
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Here I focus on efforts to bring about a better integration of compe-
tition principles and trade principles in fora like the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD, which is
the group of now 25 (since Mexico's April admission to full mem-
bership) industrially advanced democracies, plus the European
Union which participates as an observer.
The OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee has been
working for many years with the Trade Committee to find new and
creative ways in which both competition law and trade law can mu-
tually reinforce the ideal of the open and free multilateral trading
system. The two committees have sponsored joint roundtable discus-
sions on topics such as cartels, barriers to access to markets, and
predatory strategies, that have been very illuminating. They have
revealed both the importance of these kinds of practices to interna-
tional trade, but also the still-considerable gap in approach toward
them under the competition or antitrust laws of the OECD member
States.
We are committed to continuing these discussions within the
OECD, as well as with our counterparts around the world, both for-
mally and informally. The greatest benefits of these kinds of ex-
changes have been almost invisible. Through them, countries with a
shorter antitrust tradition than ours (that is, most others) have seen
for themselves the great benefits of effective and vigorous antitrust
enforcement. They have built up, to an encouraging degree, domes-
tic constituencies within their own societies for competition and free
markets. As I turn to my last option, the full-blown multilateral
treatment of antitrust in the soon-to-be-established World Trade
Organization (or WTO), we should bear in mind the importance of
this kind of grass-roots development of competition policy.
The fifth and final option is in certain ways the most ambitious,
since it differs the most from the existing legal regime for antitrust
law: an international competition code that would somehow be re-
lated to the new World Trade Organization. The first point to recall
about this option is that it is far from new. While the original
GATT was being negotiated, the same countries were also working
on an ambitious Charter for the international trading system, known
later as the Havana Charter, that would have established an Inter-
national Trade Organization. Chapter Five of that Charter would
have set forth rules on "restrictive business practices," or antitrust
principles (as we would be more likely to term them). It is striking
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today to read through Chapter Five, to see how closely it resembles
some of the proposals for a multilateral antitrust code that are cur-
rently being put forward.
I will describe the gist of it in a moment for you. However, it is
important to remember that a key reason why the ITO never came
into being, and why the U.S. Congress in particular objected to the
Havana Charter, was the feeling that the antitrust rules of Chapter
Five were not adequate for the United States, and that the rest of
the world was not yet ready to embrace a serious antitrust regime.
Article 46 of the Charter called on each Member State to "take
appropriate measures" and to cooperate with the ITO to "prevent
• . . business practices affecting international trade which restrain
competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control,
whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of
production or trade and interfere with the achievement of any of the
other objectives [of the ITO] set forth in Article 1." Article 46 also
provided that the Member States would give the ITO the power to
decide in particular cases whether the practices would have had the
proscribed effect, in accordance with powers spelled out in Articles
48 and 50.
The practices that would have been prohibited look quite familiar
to a U.S. antitrust lawyer. They included price fixing, territorial al-
locations, "discriminating against any particular enterprise," limit-
ing production or fixing production quotas, "preventing by agree-
ment the development or application of technology or invention
whether patented or unpatented," "extending the use of rights under
patents [and other forms of intellectual property]" to matters
outside the scope of the grants, and other practices similar to the
enumerated ones. Countries that believed that a particular practice
existed could consult other member countries directly, or ask for
ITO consultations. If those consultations did not work, the ITO was
empowered under Article 48 to investigate the matter. Affected
countries could file a complaint with it, which would contain the
minimum information prescribed by the ITO. Note carefully how
the ITO then would have proceeded. Article 48.3 reads as follows:
The Organization shall consider each complaint presented in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1. If the Organization deems it appropri-
ate, it shall request Members concerned to furnish supplementary
information, for example, information from commercial enterprises
within their jurisdiction. After reviewing the relevant information,
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the Organization shall decide whether an investigation is justified.
If the ITO found the investigation to be justified, it would have
been empowered to request further supplementary information from
"any Member," and to conduct hearings on the complaint. (Article
48.4.) With respect to commercial information, Article 50.3 did give
Member States the authority to withhold information from the ITO
if two criteria were met: (1) the information was not essential to the
Organization in conducting an adequate investigation, and (2) if
disclosed, the information would substantially damage the legiti-
mate business interests of a commercial enterprise.
As I said, the Havana Charter and the ITO it would have created
never went anywhere, in significant part because of U.S. objections
to these antitrust provisions. It stands today, however, as the most
fully elaborated international precedent for an antitrust code, and as
such it is well worth studying as we consider whether or not to go
down this road now.
Moreover, the Havana Charter is not the only precedent that
should give us pause. There is in fact a multilateral "Restrictive
Business Practices Code," which was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on May 2, 1980, almost exactly fourteen years ago. That
code was negotiated under the auspices of the U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development, or UNCTAD, and it therefore is oriented
toward the interests of the developing countries. Importantly, it is
nonbinding, and was understood throughout the negotiating process
as a nonbinding document. It would therefore be a serious mistake
to think that it represents the kind of language to which the United
States would be willing to adhere if, at the stroke of a pen, it were
to be made binding.
More broadly, the history of the UNCTAD RBP Code, as well as
other negotiations that involved the full U.N. membership, teaches
caution. Although there has been great progress in recent years at a
world-wide level toward acceptance of the principles of market
economies, there is still a long way to go. It is not clear whether or
not the attitudes toward intellectual property rights advocated in
those exercises (and apparent even in the Havana Charter) have
been superseded completely yet. It is fair to say, therefore, that the
potential exists for more harm than good in this critically important
area.
In addition, it remains true today that only about a third of the
nations in the world have enacted antitrust or competition laws -
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perhaps 53 or so. Many of that group of 53 have had only brief
experience with their law, and they are still developing both the ex-
pertise necessary for sound and effective enforcement, and the politi-
cal support for the sometimes harsh competitive market.
Finally, there is no escaping the fact that any kind of enforceable
and enforced worldwide competition regime would present unpre-
cedented issues relating to the appropriate kinds of follow-up and
dispute resolution mechanisms that will be required. The drafters of
the Havana Charter recognized this as well, and included the provi-
sions mentioned above that would have given the ITO access to con-
fidential business information of enterprises in countries against
which a complaint had been filed. The new International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act contains well-elaborated safeguards
that will ensure the proper treatment of all such information that is
exchanged among responsible, existing antitrust agencies - provi-
sions that the Congress included because of the concerns expressed
by the business community while the legislation was under consider-
ation. Before the necessary national support for a vastly expanded
international system can be developed, it is reasonable to assume
that enforcers and companies alike will need to build significant ex-
perience under the bilateral information sharing agreements that
will be developed under the new law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question we face today is not whether we would like to see
the internationalization of antitrust law. That decision was made
quite some time ago, by businesses and consumers alike: antitrust
law must take its place in international markets. Instead, it is how
best to go about making antitrust an effective tool to protect compe-
tition in international markets. I would like to conclude with three
key points:
First, the relationship between effective antitrust rules and the en-
forcement of those rules, on the one hand, and an open and fair
international trading system, on the other, is critical.
Second, we will be able to pursue these interests in a variety of
ways: bilaterally, 'regionally, through the important work of the
OECD, and perhaps eventually through use of the new World Trade
Organization as a forum for discussions of this and other important
issues. It is neither useful nor desirable to jump in feet first to a
world antitrust code along the lines of the Havana Charter. We will
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take this step only if and when we and our trading partners believe
that it is a necessary supplement to effective national law enforce-
ment and the cooperative arrangements we hope to develop.
Finally, our priorities over the short and medium term are to con-
tinue to work for strong and effectively enforced antitrust laws in all
countries around the world, and to improve the tools for cooperation
that link antitrust authorities. And, building on more than a century
of strong bi-partisan commitment to antitrust enforcement in this
country, we will continue to enforce U.S. antitrust law against con-
duct that harms U.S. markets to the fullest extent of our ability.

